I. INTRODUCTION
In Kimberlin v. United States Department of Justice,' the highly respected Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit swept aside constitutional objections to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' "No Frills" regulations banning electric or electronic musical instruments. Upon applying the multi-factor test articulated by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 2 the Kimberlin court found the regulations "reasonably related to the asserted goal-conserving correctional funds." ' The court reached this conclusion without needing any facts. "Common sense," posited the three-judge panel, "tells us ... that a prisoner's possession and use of an electric guitar costs correctional institutions money for electricity, upkeep, storage and supervision." 4 The plaintiff's First Amendment rights virtually dissolved into a tautology, and meanness became a constitutionally acceptable, symbolic condition of confinement.
The Kimberlin ruling can be read as an exemplar of three dominant features of prisoners' rights adjudication during the tenure of the Rehnquist Court: (1) the seemingly ubiquitous application of the deferential, rational-basis test enunciated in Turner v. Safley ("the Turner test"); (2) the trivialization of "legitimate" penal objectives, which are nonetheless allowed to trump prisoners' rights, including those "fundamental" to ordered liberty; and (3) a willingness to forego empirically based "facts" in favor of prison officials' asserted "truths." The interlocking nature of these practices has synergized the Turner test, resulting in the "Turnerization" of prisoners' rights.
This Article documents and critiques the Rehnquist Court's primary correctional legacy: the Turnerization of prisoners' rights. Part II of the Article provides historical context by presenting the genealogy of the Turner test, concluding with a description of its four parts. Part III maps the expansion of the Turner test beyond its First Amendment base into a variety of constitutional issues. Part TV critiques the underpinnings of the Turner test, finding that Turnerization has given legitimacy to a thin, underenforced federal Constitution for prisoners. Part V concludes the Article by establishing that Turnerization represents a normative strain in the bureaucratic state, with the Turner test advancing the management of prisoners as a permanent underclass and thereby inflicting great damage to the grundnorm-or basic norm-of prisoners' rights.
II. THE ORIGINS OF TURNERIZATION
The Framers did not envisage a nation where more than two million detainees and inmates reside in warehouse-like institutions. 5 At its birth, the new republic had yet to be populated by a fortress-like prison. Jails had long operated in the Old and New Worlds, mostly in a manner whereby filth, disease, and despair plagued the ranks of their wards. 6 By the eighteenth century, the management of jails epitomized arbitrary government'-the very evil that inspired the Bill of Rights.' Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 84 quoting Blackstone, wrote that "confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten," constituted "a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government" than punishment. 9 For good reason, gaolers owed their wards the duty at common law to provide a habitable environment.' 0 By the beginning of the twentieth century that duty acquired considerable breadth: In Westbrook v. State" the Georgia Supreme Court announced that a prisoner "has all the rights of the ordinary citizen which are not expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law."' 2
A. The Hands-Off Doctrine
By the 1930s, the "hands-off' doctrine had taken hold in lower federal courts. 13 It posited that federalism created a constitutional roadblock to adjudicating the merits of prisoner complaints brought from state prisons and jails. 4 Lower federal courts also advanced a host of other reasons for the hands-off doctrine, including judges' lack of familiarity with prison life 5 and that time consuming, frivolous pro se filings would clog the courts. 6 Some courts effected a hands-off policy by advancing the elusive distinccific protections embedded in the Bill of Rights took root and expanded as the new nation grappled with the proper constraints upon the coercive power wielded by the government.").
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 437-38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
10 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (acknowledging a constitutional basis for "the common law view that 'it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of liberty, care for himself") (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)); ExparteJenkins, 58 N.E. 560, 561 (Ind. App. 1900) (holding that the wife of a lynched prisoner could sue a sheriff for breach of "the duty he owes the prisoner himself to exercise reasonable and ordinary care to protect the prisoner's life and health").
11 66 S.E. 788 (Ga. 1909 tion between rights and privileges; the latter invariably formed the gravamen of the complaint, causing the plaintiff to lose. 17 Prisoners confined during the era of the hands-off doctrine experienced a host of inhumane acts, including racial segregation; 8 poor medical care;" inmate-on-inmate assault; 2° staff brutality and indifference; 2 ' and squalor. 2 2 The sordid reality of prison life under the hands-off doctrine came to the fore in a 1967 presidential commission that found confinement "at best barren and futile, at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading. Levi" 8 demonstrated the expanse of this charter. While the court spoke of deference to "the primary authority and expertise of those charged with building and running the prisons," 3 9 the decision accorded no weight to the judgments of prison officials when "made arbitrarily or in conflict with particular rights given by Constitution or statute." 4 For pretrial detainees, the charter of rights forbade "any deprivation or restriction of... rights beyond those which are necessary for confinement alone, [and any deprivation or restriction] must be justified by a compelling necessity."'" This standard effectively dictated the least-restrictive form of confinement for pretrial detainees unless their keepers advanced a strong case to the contrary-one not merely based on financial or administrative considerations. The court held that the defendants failed to meet this considerable burden of proof on several counts, including plaintiff's complaint of double-bunking. 4 Meanwhile, federal courts of appeals advanced three boundary-defining approaches. One posited that the several prongs of the Turner test applied to rights that involve "multi-faceted balancing." 8 3 In articulating this criterion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals used the Turner test to adjudicate a claim that cross-gender searches violated male inmates' right to privacy. 84 Cross-gender searches, according to the federal panel, necessitated the balancing of prisoners' rights to privacy, equal employment rights of female officers, and the institution's interest in internal security. 85 A second boundary-defining approach limited the Turner test to situations involving day-to-day penal management. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia articulated this criterion by ruling that the Turner test did not apply to a lawsuit bought by female federal prisoners who complained of unequal treatment because their male counterparts were housed closer to Washington, D.C. 86 The court observed that the proximity of the female prison rested on policy decisions rather than day-to-day management. 8 However, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion failed to identify criteria for making this determination except to posit that cruel and unusual punishment as well as racial segregation fell outside the new standard because they were incompatible with "public respect for our system of justice. The Court's decision in Johnson gave no indication that the constitutional territory it had previously staked out for the Turner test, as delineated above, would be lost to a different test. Indeed, the Court explicitly spoke of only two rights-the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and racial discrimination-that lay beyond the reach of the Turner test.17 Subsequently, lower federal courts have been true to this reading of Johnson. For example, the district court in Roe v. Crawford' rejected the plaintiffs assertion that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in prison is comparable to the right to be free of racial segregation and therefore is "not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration."' 0 9 The court asserted that By placing discrimination based on race alone outside the reach of the Turner test, Johnson invites lower federal courts to reconsider their earlier case law on sex discrimination in prison. Shortly after the ruling in Turner, however, the D.C. Circuit in Pitts v. Thornburgh 123 rejected defendant prison officials' contention that the Turner test governed alleged sexual discrimination in the housing of inmates, 124 advancing three reasons for not doing so. First, Turner addressed "the day-to-day operations of prisons that restrict the exercise of prisoners' individual rights," whereas the facts of the instant case concerned where to locate a women's prison, which the court characterized as a nonjudiciable policy decision. 125 Second, unlike the facts of Turner, the instant case alleged gender discrimination, "a classification that traditionally summons heightened scrutiny.
1 26 Finally, the right to equal protection is different from other individual rights in that it implicates the ill-will of government and thus an improper governmental motive. 121 Citing HIV-positive food servers. 14 4
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear disposed to following the Ninth Circuit's lead on this issue. In Torcasio v. Murray, 14 5 the Fourth Circuit addressed an action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff-inmate asserted that staff had failed to make necessary accommodations under the ADA by refusing to modify his cell, the prison lobby, and recreation areas. 14 6 On appeal, the circuit court granted the defendants qualified immunity because they could have reasonably believed that Turner permitted them to place penal objectives ahead of the inmate's statutory right to reasonable accommodations. 147 Quoting the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gates, the Fourth Circuit panel reasoned, "It is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more stringent application of prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act than it would the prisoners' constitutional rights." 1 4
In the Seventh Circuit decision of Love v. Westville Correctional Center, 149 a quadriplegic inmate brought suit under the ADA. He asserted that his disability prevented his use of numerous programs available to other inmates, as well as the recreational, dining, and visiting facilities. 1 5° Rather than asserting that the Turner test overrode statutory rights per se, the court stated, "It is entirely possible" that the Act's "reasonableness requirement must be judged in light of the overall institutional requirements." ' 1 5 1 This could dictate that "no reasonable accommodations were possible. 15 2 Because the defendant did not explain why it failed to accommodate the plaintiff, the court affirmed the jury award of damages. 159 When the Wolfish Court invoked a reasonableness test, it characterized its inner workings as balancing "the scope of the particular intrusion; the manner in which it was conducted; the justification for initiating it; and the place in which it is conducted." 6 ' But Chief Judge Wallace's dissent posited that "Turner does not authorize such balancing."' 6 '
Unlike Wolfish, he explained, "What Turner does not require or permit is for ajudge to look at the injury to inmates, on the one hand, and the benefit to prison administration, on the other, and say this one or that one is more important ....", He could have added that Turner dictates penal interests are presumed much weightier, placing a considerable burden on plaintiff-inmates to overcome this presumption. Hence, factual situations that balance in favor of the plaintiff-inmates under the Wolfish test could be reversed under the more deferential Turner test.
The pre-Johnson caselaw on this issue lacked consensus. 6 ' The Second Circuit presumably would use the Wolfish test for pretrial detainees given its conclusion that Turner exclusively addresses prisons rather than jails.' 6 4 The Third Circuit applied the Turner test to inmates' right of privacy in medical information' 65 and to non-therapeutic abortions.
1 66 Inmates possess "at best" a minimal right to privacy, wrote the Fifth Circuit in upholding cross-gender searches using Turner's reasonableness standard.
t6 7 The Eighth Circuit applied the Turner test in permitting surveillance of men's showers by female officers. 16 1 Its brethren on the Ninth Circuit stated that they would use those parts of the Turner test they deemed applicable to the Fourth Amendment.
1 69 In a later ruling, the Tenth Circuit embraced Wolfish's balancing test in evaluating strip searches but indicated that Turner's concern with penal aims would be pertinent in deciding the appropriateness of the search's location. v° Lastly, an Eleventh Circuit panel indicated that it would rely exclusively on all four prongs of the Turner test in determining limitations on the right to bodily privacy.'
The sparse post-Johnson caselaw favors the application of the Turner test when prison regulations limit the most fundamental of privacy rights-a female inmate's desire to terminate her pregnancy. At issue in Roe v. Crawford 172 was a Missouri prison regulation that provided transportation for an off-site abortion only to safeguard the mother's health.1 73 In finding that the Turner test governed the regulation's constitutionality, the court held that the right to an abortion is "inconsistent with proper incarceration.
d. Pretrial Detention
A line of lower federal court cases indicates that Turner does not subsume Wolfish for alleged inflictions of pretrial punish-ment.
17 5 They have stressed that Wolfish's delineation of the goals of pretrial detention differ from Turner's focus on "penological objectives." As the Second Circuit explained:
Penological interests are interests that relate to the treatment (including punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc... ) of persons convicted of crimes. Although some of the concerns of pretrial detention, especially protection against further criminal conduct, overlap with the concerns of penology, there are important differences. Penological interests are therefore arguably not an appropriate guide for the pretrial detention of accused persons.
1 76
On the. other hand, some circuits utilize the Turner test to address claims by pretrial detainees. The Ninth Circuit has embraced the Turner test when pretrial detainees assert violations of the First Amendment. 177 The Fourth Circuit has employed the four prongs of the Turner test when disabilities imposed on detainees allegedly arise from security concerns, 178 including those born of the factspecific circumstances found in Wolfish.'1 9 Lastly, the Sixth Circuit in Martucci v. Johnson 8° applied both tests: It first held that, under the Wolfish test, a detainee's segregation did not inflict punishment 8 1 and then used the Turner test in rejecting his First Amendment claims arising from jailers withholding his mail. 182 
IV. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF TURNERIZATION
The broad reach of Turnerization is matched by what Lawrence Sager would have called its "thinness"-that is, its capacity to underenforce the Constitution.' 8 3 The underpinnings of Turnerization, which are examined below, have circumscribed the potentially broad sweep of prisoners' rights. 8 4 For inmates, the consequences of underenforcement are profound. As in the previ- he Rehnquist Court's application of the Turner test bears a close resemblance to judicial minimalism, a form of judicial decisionmaking that "settles the case before it, but leaves many things undecided." 19 ' Take, for instance, the Supreme Court's ruling in Overton v. Bazzetta. 19 2 A burgeoning prison population led the Michigan Department of Corrections to limit the number of minors eligible to visit prisoners unless the minor is visiting an imprisoned parent and other kin.' 9 3 Some of the rules in question barred children of inmates whose parental rights had been terminated and required juvenile visitors to be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian.' 9 4 The Supreme Court ruled that the regulations satisfied each of the four parts of the Turner test.' 9 5 Economy of analysis characterized Justice Kennedy's majority all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." tice Kennedy's majority opinion also obtained "shallowness" by skirting any discussion of how one determines whether an asserted right is "inconsistent with proper incarceration."198 The minimalism of the Turner test accommodates and implicitly legitimates the "countermajoritarian difficulty."' 9 9 This is the notion that the powers of the Supreme Court, especially its authority to find legislation unconstitutional, improperly conflict with majority rule. 2 0 Alexander Bickel famously coined the phrase "countermajoritarian difficulty" 2 0 ' before the demise of the handsoff doctrine and thus never discussed its relationship to prisoners' rights. However, for H.N. Hirsh and other commentators, "coun- cussed footnote four provides for "more searching" or "more exacting" judicial scrutiny of government actions directed against "discrete and insular minorities." 20 5 Erwin Chemerinsky contends 196 Id. at 133. 197 The Court denied that it was precluding a right to "intimate association" and proceeded to state that it "need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association." Id. at 131-32.
198 Id. at 131 ("The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration."). that inmates ought to be regarded as one of those groups. 20 6 Indeed, several other commentators describe inmates as "a despised minority without political power, ' 20 7 "the untouchable class of American society, 1 2 0 8 and "the least sympathetic group of 'outsiders' in our constitutional jurisprudence. '20 9 Moreover, inmates bring to prison other disadvantaging qualities: They are largely undereducated 2 1° and impoverished, 2 11 and they disproportionately experience mental illness. There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth [Amendment] .
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
B. Faux Balancing
Prisoners' rights came of age in a constitutional era dominated by "balancing. '2 13 In its purest form, balancing as a mode of constitutional interpretation identifies threatened constitutional rights and assigns weight to those rights to determine if their importance exceeds that of the intruding governmental interests. The four-prong Turner test deceptively suggests balancing, particularly with regard to all but the first prong: If the court finds that the first-prong is satisfied-the presence of a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate and neutral governmental interest put forward to justify it, the court then considers the remaining prongs and balances the findings. In practice, the Turner test operates as a multi-factor test. "Turner does not authorize a balancing test," wrote the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit. 2 1 5 Unlike Bell v. Wolfish, he explained, "Turner does not require or permit . . . a judge to look at the injury to inmates, on the one hand, and the benefit to prison administration, on the other, and say this one or that one is more important "216 Moreover, the several prongs have a distinct "tilt." " [W] hat is striking about the Court's application of the Turner test," writes one commentator, "is the way in which the Turner factors are crafted (or, critics might contend, contrived) to generally foreordain a finding against a prisoner's constitutional claim." ' 2 1 7 The first prong's commitment to rationality, the sine qua non of the test categorical imperatives, occupying a higher constitutional plane than rights. Moreover, the first prong functions as the leveler of rights by drawing no distinction between "weak" (non-fundamental) and "strong" (fundamental) rights. Similarly, this prong ignores the vulnerability of inmates as powerless outcasts to government overreaching. 21 9 To make matters worse for plaintiffs, the remaining three prongs are conceptually aligned in favor of defendant prison officials. As one court observed, "the first [prong] 'looms especially large' because it 'tends to encompass the remaining [prongs] .' "220 Because of their overlapping features, the prongs operate like dominoes: Once the first and most weighty prong falls, the others do as well. A commentator elaborates:
For example, if a court finds under the first prong that there is a valid connection between a regulation and a legitimate governmental purpose, then it will naturally conclude under prong three that the exerted right would have an impact on prison staff. This makes perfect sense. If there is a legitimate reason for enacting the regulation, it must be to prevent some deleterious effect within the prison. And, once a court finds that the regulation is rationally related to a penological purpose and that it furthers prison security, the court will likely define the prisoner's right broadly in order to find, under the second prong, that there are other means available for exercising the right. Similarly, under prong four, a court will be less inclined to find that the regulation represents an exaggerated response, or that the state has alternative means of dealing with the problem at hand. 2 2 1
C. Deference
As illustrated by the Court's embrace of challenged restrictions on child visitation in Overton v. Bazzetta [Vol. 10:97empirical evidence to the contrary. 223 Whereas prison staff claimed that visiting children created disturbances, not one documented incident occurred.
2 2 4 Moreover, one study found that " [t] he presence of children makes prisons easier, not harder, to manage, and that lawsuits have not been a problem. ' 225 Similarly, the defendants' proposition that child visitors would become "too comfortable" with prison life and thus less likely to be deterred from criminal acts 2 2 6 is refuted by studies showing that children separated from an incarcerated parent suffer considerable psychological harm and become likely candidates for criminality. 227 The Rehnquist Court's strong commitment to deference 228 culture that further undermines legality. John Irwin, a former inmate turned criminologist, observed that guards as well as prison administrators perceive inmates as "worthless, untrustworthy, manipulative, and disreputable deviants. "242 James Marguart identified an officer code legitimating illegal beatings as means of order maintenance. 2 43 Kelsey Kauffman's interviews with correctional officers revealed widespread unlawful guard violence directed at inmates. 2 4 4 V.
CONCLUSION
No jailhouse lawyer would have long mourned the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist. His tenure as Chief Justice could be captured in one decision handed down shortly after his elevation: Turner v. Safley. Surely Turner remains the most influential of all prisoners' rights cases. Addressing freedom of correspondence, a preferred right given heightened scrutiny by the Turner trial court, 245 the Court applied its most deferential test. The Supreme Court, as well as the lower federal courts, quickly extended the Turner test to a host of other prisoners' rights. That Turner has worked a sea change was confirmed when the Ninth Circuit, reputed to be the nation's most liberal circuit, 246 applied this standard in ruling that the racial segregation of inmates at reception centers was constitutionally acceptable. 24 7 And while the Supreme Court in Johnson v. California retreated from its earlier language describing the Turner test as the "unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners' rights claims, ' 248 
